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Abstract 
The relationship between crime and immigration has been a matter of controversy in the 
US and around the world. This paper investigates empirically the case of Spain. From 1999 
to 2009, Spain has had a large wave of immigration from different areas of the globe. At the 
same time, crime rates have increased. However, by comparison with other European 
countries that have received similar massive immigration waves during the same period, 
crime rates in Spain have increased less considerably. We show that there is a significant 
relationship between crime and immigration. Nevertheless, the explanation is found in the 
specific characteristics of the different immigration groups, particularly in the amount and 
type of human capital, which is a result largely in tune with previous studies on US 
immigration and crime.  
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1I. Introduction
Immigration and crime are related very frequently within the media,
political discussions, and even in daily conversation. The opinion polls in
many countries show an increasing concern for the perceived correlation
between immigration and crime.
This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on
immigration and crime, with a particular application to Spanish data.
Although the relationship between crime and immigration has been the
focus of much political debate, the economic and empirical literature is not
vast. Some studies have looked into US data, but they seem to point out
that immigration and crime do not present a consistent pattern.1
The situation of the European Union is different from that of the US.
Until the late 1990s, immigration from outside of the Union was not very
significant. Furthermore, in the context of the EU Member-states, Spain
might be regarded as a particular case. Spain had an important but not
dramatic increase in crime rates while there was a very significant growth
in immigration in a short time span. The interesting puzzle is to reconcile
such a finding with the alleged fact that there is a strong correlation
between crime and immigration.
The most obvious response to this puzzle is that there is no causal
relationship between immigration and crime in Spain. However, this
relationship does exist and is quite significant in our econometric analysis.
Immigration partially explains the evolution of the crime rates in Spain in
the last decade or so, demonstrating conclusively that both phenomena are
related to a significant extent.
A second possible interpretation relies on the period of economic
growth in Spain observed in the last ten years, and the consequent
development of the labor market for immigrants in Spain. Unlike other EU
countries (such as Italy, France or Portugal), Spain has experienced a long
1 See, among others, Borjas et. al. (2006), Butcher and Piehl (1998a, 1998b, 2005), Card
(2001) and Moehling and Piehl (2007).
2period of economic growth since the mid 1990s. Economic growth has
provided for better legitimate economic opportunities in the labor market for
everyone. At the same time, it has led to an increase in new opportunities
for both natives and immigrants to commit crimes (in particular, property
and economic crimes). There is a potential substitution effect with an
ambiguous outcome. Cross-country comparisons are not helpful to
determine how this substitution effect should operate. For example, Spain
and Ireland share a high rate of economic growth during this period but
differ in terms of their increase in crime rates. On the contrary, Italy and
Greece have significantly lower entry of immigration and worse growth
rates in the period 2000 to 2006, and yet they present similar patterns to
Spain with respect to crime rates.
On the other hand, and focusing exclusively on the case of Spain, the
evolution of the different types of crime does not have a consistent
relationship with the rate of unemployment, as shown in Figure 1.
Additionally, one has to remember that a major portion of the immigrant
population has entered the country illegally and have remained illegal until
an official regularization has taken place. These regularizations have
occurred twice but have apparently not affected significantly crime rates.2
<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE>
We need a more sophisticated explanation. We suggest our puzzle
can be solved by concentrating on the types of immigrants coming into the
country. The bulk of the thesis is that Spain has received immigrants that,
because of their characteristics (i.e., age, gender, education, and culture),
are less likely to commit crimes. We refer to this explanation as cultural
proximity.
2 Two regularization amnesties took place in 2000 and 2005 in order to solve the situation
of illegal immigrants. The amnesty of 2000 required entry in to Spain before June 1999, an
expired permit of residence or working permit, and no criminal record. Almost a quarter of
a million people benefited from this legal reform. The amnesty of 2005 only required having
a job or an offer of a job in Spain (an employment contract for at least six months). Almost
six hundred thousand people benefited from this second amnesty.
3Immigration in Spain is a phenomenon that is extremely
heterogeneous. By that we mean that immigration to Spain encompasses
very different realities, from a retired German woman who spends her
retirement pension in Spain to a young Ecuadorian man who works in
construction to help his family back in his native country.
Our hypothesis is that the specific composition of the immigrant
population determines the degree of correlation between immigration and
crime to a great extent. In the particular case of Spain, a large proportion
of the immigrant population has characteristics that make them less likely
to commit crimes than otherwise.
Obviously, it could be that the process of integration is particularly
adequate and successful in Spain. An adequate and successful integration
policy could substantially reduce crime rates that are explained by
immigration elsewhere. Depending on their cultural upbringing,
immigrants usually could be more or less inclined to criminal activities
depending on institutional characteristics of each native country.
Nevertheless, in those countries where immigrants are better integrated, it
is expected that fewer criminal offenses are committed.
On Table 1, we show the rate of homicides per thousand habitants – a
crime easily comparable for the purpose of criminal law specifics – of people
with different nationalities in their country of origin and in Spain. If we look
at each continent individually, one has very different rates of homicide even
though the proportions in Spain and in the countries of origin are fairly
similar, as seen in Column 3. At the same time, the differences across
continents of origin can indicate that different nationalities represent a
distinct attitude towards crime which might not have been eliminated by
the process of integration.3
3 In the period 2000-2009, the nationalities with the highest annual immigration rates are,
by order of magnitude, Moroccans, Ecuadorians, Romanians and Colombians. The
nationalities with the highest annual crime rates are, by order of magnitude, Algerians,
Romanians and Moroccans. Colombians, Ecuadorians and Peruvians follow significantly
below.
4<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>
On Table 2, we present some statistics about different crimes and the
origin or nationality of the immigrants arrested for such crimes. We can
immediately see that there are significant variations across nationalities
and across crimes.
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>
In this study, we present an empirical analysis that aims at
responding conclusively to these issues4 In section two, we discuss the
economic model of criminal behavior that provides the theoretical
foundation for the main hypothesis. In section three, we test
econometrically the hypothesis and, in section four, we discuss the empirical
results. Section five concludes.
II. Economic Models of Criminal Behavior
The economic model of crime (Becker, 1968; Garoupa, 1997; Polinsky and
Shavell, 2000) is based on the rational comparison between the benefits and
the costs of committing an offense. Under-compliance with the law arises
when the benefits of compliance are lower than the costs. Usually the
benefits of a crime include the illegal gain obtained by the criminal whereas
the costs include the probability and severity of punishment (although the
economic model has been extended to include other factors). The approach
in the economic model is to hypothesize that everyone is a potential
criminal, however only a subset of the population does indeed commit
crimes. As a result, the economic model does not provide any particular
argument for why immigrants should under-comply with the law more or
4 Previous work with Spanish provincial data on crime, but disregarding immigration,
includes Buonanno and Montolio (2008). For the Italian case, see Bianchi et. al. (2008) and
Buonanno et. al. (2009).
5less frequently than natives, except that their profile of benefits and costs of
crime could be different from that of natives.
In this context, from a theoretical perspective, there are countervailing
arguments about the higher or lower propensity of immigrants towards
crime with respect to natives, based on their profile of costs and benefits.
However, the strength of these arguments depends obviously on empirical
confirmation. Only a serious and rigorous empirical analysis can decide
which reasons do actually prevail in reality.
The first argument is that, due to difficulties in the labor market and for
lack of economic opportunities, the illegal gain obtained by immigrants is
relatively higher than that of natives. In other words, it could be that
immigrants have less to lose than natives from noncompliance with the law.
The argument is based on the income/employment status of the individual;
that is to say, it has nothing to do with the particular attribute of being an
immigrant, but with the fact that a higher proportion of the immigrant
population has economic problems or has fewer economic opportunities.5
A second argument looks at cooperative crimes that require a close
network of trust and coordination. The economic literature has discussed
how organized crime can develop mechanisms of control and quality
assurance (Garoupa, 2007) and has identified ethnic homogeneity as a very
powerful mechanism to guarantee the success of a criminal organization.
Ethnic and family ties reduce opportunism and hold-ups in the criminal
network, therefore achieving the necessary levels of trust for a profitable
and lucrative criminal enterprise. In that respect, homogeneous and closed
immigrant communities can be an attractive focal point for these activities.6
Hence, it would be no surprise if criminal enterprises or gangs on
prostitution, drugs, money laundering, and traffic of weapons, women or
5 In a fully rational model, labor market arguments could explain overall crime rates.
However, in a bounded rational model such as the one endorsed by behavioral law and
economics, labor marker arguments should be more relevant to explain property crime and
those crimes more directly pursued for economic reasons.
6 The same argument also explains why certain (legal) business activities and enterprises
that require trust and coordination attract immigrant communities. Hence, we would
expect immigrant communities to be more engaged in criminal activities and in certain
entrepreneurial activities.
6babies were dominated by immigrants. The closeness of immigrant
communities provides the necessary and trustworthy link between the home
and the resident countries. These effects will necessarily be reduced when
the immigrant community becomes better integrated in the resident country
and grows larger. It is true that larger cities (such as Barcelona or Madrid
in Spain, or New York and Chicago in the US) facilitate the search of
contacts that might help the expansion of criminal activities. However, an
integrated and large immigrant community will lose the homogeneity and
closeness that makes it attractive for criminal enterprises of this type. In
summary, for criminal activities that require coordination and trust, we
should expect to find a disproportional representation of immigrant
communities.7
A third argument relies on the cost of under-compliance. It has been
documented by legal economists (McAdams, 2000) that compliance with the
law is easier to achieve when it embodies social norms shared by most
individuals in a community and when it triggers psychological reactions
that limit criminal opportunism (because individuals are socialized in a
culture that inculcates since childhood that certain behaviors are just
wrong). We can talk of under-compliance due to different cultural
perceptions. Examples could include terrorist acts, gender violence or
antisocial behavior, where asymmetries of social norms and cultural values
could generate different perceptions about not only the law, but also the
fairness and general acceptance of the law. As perceptions converge, either
because the immigrant community internalizes the national social norms
due to successful integration or because the law is reformed to accommodate
7 There is no detailed evidence we can use in our dataset to test this hypothesis. According
to the Spanish Office of the Chief Prosecutor, there were 482 criminal organizations in 2006
(compared to 594 in 2002 and 494 in 2004). Three groups are quite significant: Colombians
(142 organizations), Moroccans (108 organizations) and Romanians (92 organizations). The
Office of the Chief Prosecutor points out that these ethnic organizations are quite
consolidated and are responsible for a large proportion of the crimes committed by illegal
organizations in Spain. While the Moroccan and Romanian organizations largely operate in
all criminal markets, the Colombians focus on the market for narcotics and related
activities (money laundering, corruption and violence).
7the diversity of perceptions, this type of under-compliance will tend to be
mitigated.
A fourth argument could be less knowledge of local laws. Immigrants
could violate the law by mistake more frequently simply because they ignore
the law or are unaware of the specific enforcement choices of national
authorities. Ignorance of the law is no excuse in a court of law, but it may
nevertheless lead to more frequent criminal behavior among immigrants
than among natives. Presumably, this argument can only be relevant for
those areas of the law that require a degree of sophistication that make it
more difficult for the immigrant community to immediately grasp the
substance and the procedure of local laws. This could include, for example,
antisocial behavior, traffic offenses, consumption of illegal substances, and
so on.
A final argument has to do with risk aversion. If criminals have a less
risk averse utility profile (Becker, 1968), it may be that immigrants are on
average closer to such profile than natives because there is a selection effect
due to immigration. The latter being, intrinsically, a risky activity;
presumably only people with lower risk aversion become immigrants.
However, notice that the underlying risks, for immigration and for crime,
are different and hence the selection effect could well not be very relevant
(Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti, 2008).
So far we have identified reasons for why immigrants could be more
prone to commit certain crimes. They include the labor market and general
economic conditions, need for cooperation and trust, costs of under-
compliance due to different cultural perceptions, less knowledge of local
laws, and (less convincingly) lower risk aversion.
However, there are also good economic reasons for why immigrants
could be less prone to commit other types of crime. One obvious reason has
to do with opportunities. First, earning potentials could be higher for
immigrants, so that the lost legal earnings due to criminal activities could
be more significant as a deterrent. Second, if immigrants tend to be located
in more depressed economic neighborhoods, then they have fewer
8opportunities for property crime. Third, even if economic well-being
determines that immigrants could be more likely to commit certain
economic crimes, it is also likely that those crimes that require specific
levels of human capital or technology will be committed less by immigrants
(for example, regulatory and administrative crimes). Another line of
reasoning could be that if immigrants have certain distinct characteristics
that make them easier to be targeted by the enforcement authorities, then
they could be more deterred since the expected severity of punishment could
be higher. Furthermore, the risk of deportation could make punishment
more costly. Finally, less knowledge of local laws could drive them to comply
due to overestimating punishment.
As we have seen, there is no economic theory that provides support to
the hypothesis that there is a strong correlation between crime and
immigration. In fact, the economic arguments about differential behavior
towards crime among natives and immigrants are mixed. Furthermore, the
sign and the degree of correlation between crime and immigration is
expected to differ by crime types. If there exists a linkage between
immigration and certain crime types, it is probably better explained by
incentives that factor into opportunism rather than by any specific attribute
of the immigrant community.
Given the relevant explanations and the available data for the
Spanish economy and society, we suggest that the economic theory at its
best proposes a very weak positive correlation between general crime rates
and immigration. The theoretical reasons for more crime (labor market and
general economic conditions, need for cooperation and trust, costs of under-
compliance due to different cultural perceptions, less knowledge of local
laws, and lower risk aversion) might weakly dominate the theoretical
reasons for less crime (opportunity costs, information available, access to
technology). In summary, we suggest that, focusing on the criminal data
published by the Spanish authorities, the arguments for a positive
9correlation are likely to be more relevant than the arguments for a negative
correlation.8
Notice, however, that we hypothesize a weak positive correlation, the
argument being cultural proximity. Immigrants with cultural proximity to
the Spanish society will have a profile of preferences akin to natives.
Therefore, the economic model should predict that differences in criminal
behavior cannot be significant.
The possible testable hypothesis we suggest is that crimes committed
by immigrants can be explained by labor market conditions and economic
opportunities. Education might also be used as a proxy for knowledge of
local laws and reliance on closed ethnical groups; hence higher levels of
education should reduce crime. Age and gender is also relevant for the
(unconditional) probability of under-compliance; in particular young males
are responsible for most law infractions. Urban areas could have an
important impact because they reduce the probability of detection but also
the likelihood of strong ethnic ties. At the same time, following the criminal
proximity argument, the presence of Spanish speaking immigration should
decrease the incidence of criminal behavior.
III. Econometric Approach
As discussed in the previous section, the baseline economic model we use
lies on the traditional choice-theoretic approach at the individual level, as
discussed in the previous section (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973). At each
period t, each individual i decides whether or not to commit a crime. Each
8 Immigrants can also be disproportionally affected by crime as victims. There is no similar
sophisticated economic model for victimization of crime. In fact, a major criticism to the
economic literature of crime is that it is oriented to deterrence and seriously neglects the
role of the victim (Garoupa, 1997). However, from a theoretical perspective, we can also
consider possible reasons for why immigrants could be the targets of crimes more often
than natives. One obvious example is hate crimes, crimes motivated by racism or
xenophobia (Dharmapala and Garoupa, 2004). Another example is crimes related to the
legal status or regulation of immigration such as corruption in obtaining residence permits
or other type of extortions for social benefits. Finally, crimes committed within closed
ethnic homogeneous groups could also affect immigrants in a disproportional way. The
available data for Spain does not allow us to test any of these possible explanations.
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individual lives in a particular location l, being assumed that a person only
commits crimes within the location of residence. Defining Yit as a binary
variable that takes the value of 1 when individual i commits a crime and 0
otherwise, the probability that individual i commits a crime at period t can
thus be written as
Pr(Yit=1|Zlt,Xit) = F(Xlt'β+ Xit'γ+μit+ηit)
where Xlt is a vector of observable location-specific characteristics and Xit is
a vector of observable individual-specific characteristics; such location-
specific and individual-specific characteristics might affect the opportunity
costs of committing a crime with respect to engaging in legal economic
activities. In addition, there can be further individual-specific and location-
specific characteristics, denoted respectively by μit and ηit, potentially
affecting the individual’s decision of crime commission, which nonetheless
are unobserved by the researcher. Among the individual variables, it is of
particular interest to consider whether the individual is an immigrant or
not, even including his specific nationality. We should also consider the level
of education, age, gender, etc. As to the location-specific variables, we
consider the Spanish province in which the individual lives, and whether
the individual resides in an urban or rural area (or the size of the
municipality in which the individual resides). Also, economic characteristics
of the location, such as the unemployment rate and the per capita income,
provide a measure of the economic prospects of their residents in the legal
labor market.
In addition, we are concerned with individual's criminal experience, a
relevant aspect already discussed in the literature (Sah, 1991; Glaeser et al.,
1996; Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Grogger, 1995). This factor has a potential
relevance regarding the relative cost of entry in criminal activity, the
learning curve, and the economic opportunities for recidivists in the legal
labor market. Consequently, the probability of crime commission can be
written as
Pr(Yit=1|Zlt,Xit) = F(δ Yi,t-1 +Xlt'β+ Xit'γ+μit+ηit).
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To estimate this model, we would ideally use a representative sample
of the population, yet, as is usually the case, there is not individual-level
data available. Instead, we must rely on aggregate data by geographic
locations. Our location units are the fifty Spanish provinces.9 The use of
province-level data involves data aggregation among individuals within
each location unit, as well as several statistical assumptions, which are
treated in detail for the empirical studies about crime by Durlauf et al.
(2010).10 The underlying conditional probability for individual crime action
is implicitly characterized by a linear probability model.
The consequence of using aggregate data at the province level is that
the dependent variable is no longer the probability that an individual will
commit crime. Instead, it turns out to be the crime rate, i.e., the number of
criminal acts relative to the province population. Also, when aggregating
whether each individual within a province committed a crime in the
previous year, we will get the lagged crime rate. Each of the explanatory
variables related to a particular individual characteristic will shape the
proportion of people living in the province with such characteristic after
aggregating.
The explanatory variables will consist of the lagged crime rate, the
proportion of immigrants in the province (which will be further broken down
by country or geographic zone of origin), the province rate of unemployment
of these groups (including that of the nationals), the proportion of
individuals in each collective with a given level of education, the proportion
of the population that lives in urban areas, and the proportion of individuals
9 At the administrative level, Spain is broken down into fifty provinces and two
autonomous North-African cities, Ceuta and Melilla, which were excluded from the analysis
because of their different idiosyncrasy due to their geography and history.
10 In addition to the usual parameter homogeneity assumption, for the model to preserve
the interpretation of the baseline behavioral model at the individual level, it is required: (i)
the implicit individual utility function be linear; (ii) constraints on the dependence between
the two sources of unobservable terms and the observed individual-specific and location-
specific variables; (iii) constraints on the dependence between unobservable terms and the
observed individual-specific and location-specific variables. Also, the underlying conditional
probability for individual crime commission is implicitly characterized by a linear
probability model, which also introduces further constraints on the implicit random utility
function.
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in a predetermined range of ages in each collective, and the GDP per capita,
among other things.
Our empirical specifications, using l and t to index provinces and
years, respectively, are written as follows
'
, , 1 , ,l t l t l t l t l tC C Z u       
where C represents the crime rate, and Z is the covariates affecting this
rate. The last three terms represent unobserved variables that capture
province-level unobserved heterogeneity, aggregate shocks common to all
provinces, and a term that comprises idiosyncratic shocks, measurement
errors in the dependent variable, and aggregation errors. Even though in
the individual-level model the covariates might be uncorrelated with the
unobserved factors, the RHS variables in the aggregate regression are
potentially correlated with the unobservable variables.
Given the features of the different unobserved components, we
propose the following strategy. First, assuming that province-level
unobserved heterogeneity is invariant over time, we can exploit the
longitudinal data structure, and apply a fixed effects transformation to
remove this unobserved component. Namely, denoting Δ as the first-
differences operator,11 the fixed-effects transformation yields the following
model:
'
, , 1 , ,l t l t l t t l tC C Z u        
where all the variables are now expressed in first-differences, but the
parameters of interest are kept invariant. Second, the potential endogeneity
between the covariates and the unobserved idiosyncratic term ul,t remains
after the fixed-effects transformation. Consequently, the covariates must be
instrumented for. It is not obvious, though, whether there exist external
valid instruments, consisting of variables not included in the model but
uncorrelated with the unobserved components.12 Most often, the obvious
11 For any variable Vl,t , ΔVl,t=Vl,t-Vl,t-1.
12 In the search for appropriate instruments external to the model, in the case of
immigration variables, which are of our main concern, we should look for variables highly
correlated with immigration while exogenous to our model. Among the potential
13
instruments are the lagged explanatory variables, which are not correlated
with the current realizations of the error term.
Our estimation approach consists of a generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator (see Hansen, 1982; Arellano and Bond 1991). We consider
a system-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Given the small sample size, the
standard errors must be appropriately corrected from potential finite-
sample biases following Windmeijer (2004).
IV. Discussion of Results
In table 3, we present the descriptive statistics of our endogenous
variables. We use four measures of criminal activity. The first variable is
total crime infractions, including felonies and misdemeanors.13 The second
variable is felonies only.14 The third variable is misdemeanors only (crimes
less serious than a felony). Property crimes, the last variable, involve the
taking of money or property without violence or threat of violence against a
victim (included in felonies).15 We can see that misdemeanors (which are
candidates, we can think of the province-level weight of services and construction sectors in
GDP, the investment expenditure in public infrastructures, and the share of employment in
low-skilled industries. Given the high level of participation of immigrants in such economic
activities, such potential instruments are positively correlated with the proportion of
immigrants in province populations. However, its exogenous nature is under question, to
the extent that the higher these variables, the higher the immigrants’ opportunities in the
legal sector, what might affect the immigrants’ propensity to be involved in the crime
sector.
13 We produce results for the total crime rate because it has been used very often in
previous related studies. However, we believe that the total crime rate is not very
informative since it aggregates too many different activities concerning under-compliance
with the law: violent crimes, organized crime, property crime, administrative infractions
and misdemeanors. When using the total crime rate, we are weighting uniformly all these
activities, irrespective of their type (in fact, we could argue that it is unclear how the
weights should be determined). Also we are implicitly imposing that a change in any right-
hand-side variable of the econometric model leads to a certain increase/decrease in the
number infractions, irrespective of their nature.
14 Under Spanish criminal law, it includes property crimes, crimes against people
(homicides, injuries), crimes against freedom and collective security (drugs, road traffic),
crimes against the government and the courts (mainly noncompliance with judicial
decisions) and public order.
15 This is probably the cleanest measure of crime for statistical purposes out of the four we
use and the one most easily related to the economic model. However, since our hypothesis is
also related to noneconomic variables, in particular cultural proximity, it seems to us more
14
mostly punished with administrative penalties) are more numerous on
average whereas property crimes exhibit a larger relative dispersion.
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE>
There are good cautious reasons to use four measures of criminal
activity. All capture criminal behavior although they might exhibit a
different pattern. Felonies have increased only slightly during this period,
whereas the misdemeanors have rapidly increased. Moreover, there might
be a substitution effect in property crime, where immigrants could have
replaced natives. Furthermore, property crimes could adhere to economic
models more easily than other crimes. Finally, there have been legal
changes during the sample period that have transformed misdemeanors into
felonies, which justify why we should look at the total crime rate just to
make sure our results are not contaminated by legal reform.16
As explanatory variables related to immigration, we consider the
proportion of immigrants to the province’s total population. Additionally, we
consider the proportion of immigrants that speak Spanish as a native
language and those whose nationality is from the European Union before
the expansions that occurred during this decade (EU15). These last two
variables were considered because of their quantitative importance
(although their share of total immigration has been decreasing in the
sample period). The specific consideration of immigrants from different
nationalities should control for different attitudes among these groups.17
comprehensive and technically more competent to test also the other two variables, felonies
and misdemeanors.
16 The reason why we do not use the homicides rate, the best feasible measure of crime for
regression analysis, as a possible dependent variable is due to the small numbers as
evident from Table 2 and small annual variations. According to the Spanish Ministry of
Interior, in 2006 there were 570 homicides, 436 committed by Spanish citizens and 134 by
foreigners. These numbers compare with 470 homicides in 2000, 373 committed by Spanish
citizens and ninety-seven by foreigners.
17 Unfortunately, the lack of representativeness of other immigrants of different countries
of origin in low populated provinces has precluded us to control for more disaggregated
measures of immigration.
15
To account for the effect of living in large urban agglomerations, we
have considered the percentage of province population living in cities with
at least 100 thousand and 500 thousand inhabitants. Another characteristic
that we use is the GDP per capita and the rate of unemployment in the
province. These two variables provide a measure of economic legitimate
opportunities. The hypothesis is that better economic opportunities in the
legal labor market make criminal activity less attractive.
We also use measures to control for differences among immigrants
and natives. We use the corresponding proportions of immigrants and
natives which have completed at least secondary education. Unfortunately,
given the lack of representativeness of these collectives in provinces with
small population, we have used data at the regional level from the Spanish
Labor Force Survey. Consequently, we cannot exploit the variability across
provinces of the same region. This same data source has been exploited to
calculate, at the regional level, the proportion of young male natives and
immigrants, respectively, for which we have considered separately two age
cohorts, fifteen to twenty-four and twenty-five to thirty-four years old. Table
4 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables.
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE>
For every measure of crime rate, we have considered three different
estimation methods, which are presented in Table 5. 18
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE>
As a benchmark, we consider the OLS estimations of the
untransformed model. For the aforementioned reasons, such estimates are
expected to be inconsistent because of the correlation between unobserved
18 With respect to misdemeanors, a legal reform, performed in 2003, turned a great part of
the misdemeanors related to physical aggression and threats, particularly among family
members, to felonies with criminal consequences. The inclusion of year binary dummies
allows us to control for this legal change.
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province-level characteristics and the covariates. We also report the within-
groups estimations, which consist of least squares estimates of a fixed-effect
transformation of the aggregate model. Even though the within-groups
transformation removes the unobserved time-invariant province effects, the
resulting estimates might not be consistent if the variables are not strictly
exogenous, which is not held for the reasons explained earlier. Either way,
we report both OLS and within-groups estimates for the purpose of
comparison. Last, we report the system-GMM results, in which the
instrument set is composed of the second and third lags of the explanatory
variables.
In order to assess the quality of the GMM estimates, we have used
two types of specification tests, the Hansen-Sargan test to check for the
validity of the instrument set, and the AR(2) test of error autocorrelation.
The latter test does not show any evidence of error within the specifications
in any of the cases. However, the Hansen-Sargan test seems to reject the
specifications in the case of total crime. With respect to total crimes, which
include both felonies and misdemeanors, the aggregation of remarkably
different infractions is the most likely reason for the rejection of the
specification. Namely, we are aggregating offenses that are very different in
nature, implicitly supposing that the effect of the explanatory variables is
simply proportional to the number of different illegal activities. On the other
hand, the specification tests for felonies and property crimes behave well.
In the case of total crimes, OLS estimates exhibit that the presence of
immigrants is positive and significant, but being a Spanish speaking (Latin
American) immigrant offsets the positive effect of being an immigrant on
crime. However, when we consider the within-groups and, more
importantly, the GMM estimates, the coefficients on the immigrant shares
keep their signs but are no longer significant. In fact, the lagged total crime
rate is the only significant variable in the GMM estimates. This fact,
together with the Hansen-Sargan test, whose low p-value casts doubt on the
validity of the specification, behind which underlies the aggregation of
remarkably different crime infractions, with very different attitudes and
17
behavioral issues behind them. This result suggests a focus on different
types of infractions, namely the three that we have proposed earlier.
The main estimation results obtained for the different crime types
can be summarized as follows. First, variations in the presence of
immigrants at the different provinces have a significant impact. Second,
there is a differential attitude towards crime across different immigrants by
geographical area of origin and personal characteristics. Third, previous
crime history, captured by the lagged crime rate, has a substantial effect.
Regarding the estimated effect of total immigration, OLS estimates of
the share of immigrants in the total population is positive and significant
for every type of crime considered. This implies that the rise in immigration
increases crime, even after controlling for observable characteristics like the
economic conditions and the composition of the population. However, when
considering the within-group estimates, the estimated effect becomes non-
significant. However, neither the OLS nor the within-group estimators
account properly for the potential endogeneity problems. Our GMM
estimations confirm the importance of immigration when explaining crime
during this period, yet the effects are different both at the qualitative and
the quantitative level. In the case of misdemeanors, the share of immigrants
is still positive but not significant.
The estimations also corroborate our hypothesis concerning different
behavior of the different groups of immigrants based on geographical area of
origin.19 The models that account for the shares of immigrant population
who speak Spanish as a native language (mostly Latin American
immigrants), on the one hand, or come from one of the EU15 countries, on
the other hand, are particularly relevant. These variables ought to be
interpreted as an additional effect given the characteristics already
controlled, specially being an immigrant. For all crime types, being a
Spanish speaking immigrant reduces the likelihood of criminal activity in
19 We have concentrated on these two groups of immigrants by geographical area of origin
since they are very representative in most of the provinces considered. The fact that the
representativeness of many other groups of immigrants from other countries is very
unequal has prevented us from controlling for further areas of origin.
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an important and significant way, although the precision of such an
estimate is reduced for misdemeanors. To a lower extent, being an EU15
immigrant also appears to reduce the propensity to commit crime, but both
the magnitude and the precision of the estimated effect for this group of
immigrants is much lower.
We have also controlled for the percentage of immigrants and natives
who have completed at least secondary education. Its significance and
interpretation appear ambiguous. Given the importance of Latin American
immigrants, we have also accounted for the percentage in this group who
has completed at least secondary education, finding a negative but clearly
non-significant effect for property crimes and misdemeanors. Together with
the general result concerning Spanish speaking immigrants, we can
interpret our results as showing that the cultural proximity of this group to
the native population has played an outstanding role in explaining the
exceptional case of Spain.
The lagged crime rate exhibits a significantly positive effect, being close
to unity (but clearly below one for all crime types), which suggests a
substantial inertia in crime dynamics. We interpret this result as the
importance of the learning curve in crime propensity. Interestingly, the
highest inertia is found for misdemeanors and, to a lesser extent, property
crimes, being lower for felonies, which are precisely the crime types for
which economic reasons need not play a major role.
Concerning the remaining variables, we observe that, in line with the
economic model of crime, the GMM estimates for GDP per capita exhibit a
negative effect, although not significant. On the other hand, the estimates of
province unemployment rate are very imprecise.20
We have also controlled for the proportion of people living in highly
populated areas, by means of the variables indicating the proportion of the
20 Ideally, we would like to consider unemployment rates in the province for natives and
immigrants. Nevertheless, the level of representativeness for immigrants was very poor for
underpopulated provinces, and even for some underpopulated regions. Therefore, we have
opted out of using province unemployment rates as a measure of employment opportunities
for both natives and immigrants.
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province population living in cities above 100 thousand and 500 thousand
inhabitants. These variables are intending to capture the difficulty of
detection and the less likelihood of strong ethnic ties, as measured by the
size of the population. Although not significant, if anything, we find that
such effect is positive, especially for felonies, in line with the evidence that
population density favors crime as it hardens crime prosecution.
Finally, given that most crimes are committed by young males, we have
considered the percentage of male natives and immigrants aged between
fifteen and twenty-four, and between twenty-five and thirty-four. We find
that, in the case of property crimes and misdemeanors, the percentage of
male immigrants aged between twenty-five and thirty-four years is
statistically significant, indicating that age and gender may affect an
individual’s propensity to commit crimes. It must be noted, as seen in Table
4, that the share of young males is much higher for immigrants than for
natives.
We have also considered alternative specifications in order to assess the
robustness of our results. First, we have considered alternative instrument
sets to gauge the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of different lags of
the covariates in the instrument set. Second, we have considered a
nonlinear transformation of the crime rate, to evaluate the robustness of our
results to departures of the underlying linear probability model at the
individual level. Third, we have considered a static specification, which
excluded the lagged crime rate.
The results, not reported here (but available upon request), can be
summarized as follows. First, changes in the instrument set, particularly
the lags of the explanatory variables included, mostly affected the precision
of the estimates while the main qualitative results remain. Second, defining
a nonlinear transformation of the crime rate, which is consistent with an
underlying logistic distribution of the individual probability of committing
crime, the qualitative results are kept. However, we have opted out of our
specification, since the interpretation of estimation is clearer. Last,
regarding the static model, ignoring the lagged crime rate led to a clear
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rejection of the specification, except for misdemeanors, and the precision of
the estimates, particularly for the immigrant shares, was substantially
reduced.
In summary, our results largely confirm the hypothesis that we have
developed before and are consistent with the economic literature.
V. Conclusions
The present work introduces a first comprehensive analysis of the
relationship between immigration and crime in Spain. In the context of the
EU, Spain is not a country with high crime rates. During the last decade of
significant immigration, Spain has seen an important rise in crime at a
similar pace with its immigrant population, but to a lower rate than other
countries. We hypothesize that the explanation of this behavior is related to
the individual characteristics of the immigrants that Spain has received. We
argue that it is not so much the number of immigrants but the specific
characteristics that seem to explain the relationship between crime and
immigration in Spain.
In this respect, cultural proximity and education must be specially
noted. Immigrants from some populous groups, such as those who are
Spanish native speaking, present a substantial proportion of people with at
least secondary education, for whom criminality is much lower. This effect
has contributed decisively to avoid any kind of explosion of criminality.
Gender has also positively contributed to this effect. In fact, even after
controlling by gender and education, we can still conclude that Latin
American immigration has probably undermined the potential rise of
criminal rates in Spain. This result also happens, to a lesser extent, with
EU15 immigrants. Our result is fully consistent with the evidence for the
United States regarding Mexican immigrants (known as the Latino
Paradox), where immigration from Mexico has lowered crime rates in some
areas.21
21 See, for example, the discussion by Sampson (2008) and references therein.
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Other immigrant groups with lower education levels have contributed
significantly to the rise in crime rates. It must also be noted that these
immigrants started at arrival with a crime rate significantly higher than
Spanish nationals, but have been converging as their size and composition
changed. It must be noted the specific case of the Romanian immigrant
group, now one the most numerous in Spain. Even though it started with
high crime rates, nowadays it presents lower rates than nationals in the
twenty-fifty age group.
This work also provides for a good example of standard discussions in
the econometrics of crime. We have observed how the booming stage of the
business cycle in Spain reduced crime because it increased the opportunity
cost; we have seen that population density favors crime because it makes
harder the identification and tracking of criminals; we have concluded that
crime is concentrated among young males and lesser-educated individuals.
The implications of this work for designing public policies are clear.
Immigration is not a simple homogeneous phenomenon and must not be
treated as such. Public authorities should respond with differentiated
policies, depending on the relevant characteristics.
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Figure 1
Variation of Crime and Unemployment in Spain, 2000-2006
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Table 1
Homicide Rates in Spain and the Country of Origin
Homicide Rate in
Spain (A)
Homicide Rate in
the Native
Country (B)
Ratio (A) / (B)
Europe United
Kingdom
14.8 1.5 9.6
Romania 26.7 2.4 10.9
Africa Algeria 98.7 1.7 56.9
Morocco 30.8 0.5 64.8
America Colombia 29.1 59.3 0.5
Ecuador 13.1 17.0 0.8
Peru 5.5 4.9 1.1
Asia China 14.3
Source: MIR (Spain), INE (Spain) and UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
Note: The homicide rate (A) is the ration of number of homicides committed by immigrants in
Spain per 1,000,000 population (average 2000-2006); the homicide rate (B) is the ratio of the
number of homicides in the native country per 1,000 population (1999).
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Table 2
Crime Rates in Spain and the Country of Origin, average 2000-2006
Homicide Battery Burglary Theft Drug Traffic
United
Kingdom
0.8 5.8 5.6 2.8 6.0
Romania 0.4 3.5 24.2 21.8 0.9
Algeria 1.1 5.6 57.7 33.1 12.6
Morocco 0.6 4.6 11.9 12.0 11.7
Colombia 0.8 3.0 5.0 3.3 11.0
Ecuador 0.3 2.8 1.5 2.6 0.7
Peru 0.2 1.9 2.0 5.8 0.7
China 0.4 1.5 0.5 0.6 0.1
Source: MIR and INE
Note: The crime rate is the ratio of arrested persons per 1,000 population of age 20-50.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics: Crime Rates
(number of crimes per 10,000 inhabitants - provincial data)
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Felony Rate 450 200 112 53 722
Property Crime Rate 450 155 90 36 496
Misdemeanors Rate 450 204 79 56 494
Crime Rate 450 399 180 110 1139
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
% Immigrants 450 4.7 4.3 0.3 21.5
% Spanish speaking immigrants 450 28.2 21.3 0 76.0
% EU-15 immigrants 450 5.4 15.3 0 71.4
% pop. in cities > 100,000 inhab. 450 17.7 4.6 9.2 34.0
% pop. in cities > 500,000 inhab. 450 10.9 5.2 2.2 33.3
GDP per capita 450 17.7 4.6 9.2 34.0
Unemployment Rate 450 10.9 5.2 2.2 33.3
% natives w/ secondary educ. 450 59.0 6.0 46.7 74.3
% immigrants w/ secondary educ. 450 68.3 9.8 24.4 92.2
% Spanish speaking immigrants w/
secondary educ.
450 76.4 8.4 41.8 100.0
% Male natives aged 15-24 450 13.3 1.9 9.5 18.6
% Male natives aged 25-34 450 16.1 1.5 12.5 20.7
% Male Immigrants aged 15-24 450 15.5 2.8 8.1 22.4
% Male Immigrants aged 25-34 450 30.3 5.7 11.1 40.4
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Table 5
Estimations for Crime Rates
Total crime rates Felony rates Property crime rates Misdemeanor rates
OLS Within GMM OLS Within GMM OLS Within GMM OLS Within GMM
% Immigrants 4.38† 9.09 6.86 3.43§ 5.38* 8.69§ 2.97§ 4.17 7.05† 1.48† 4.55 4.11
2.32 7.30 8.51 1.53 3.64 3.62 1.27 3.36 3.60 0.88 4.12 3.29
% Spanish speaking immigrants -7.24† -8.61 -16.06 -5.98§ -4.89 -17.09§ -5.50§ -5.14 -14.86§ -2.27* -5.81 -14.42*
3.84 12.77 18.65 2.58 6.49 6.67 2.24 6.46 7.42 1.67 7.46 9.56
% EU-15 immigrants -1.14 -26.89 -6.72 -0.47 -19.18§ -6.43* -0.09 -20.21§ -5.09 0.15 -4.19 4.02
2.78 14.09 11.16 1.62 7.67 4.53 1.53 6.74 4.19 1.33 7.62 5.24
% pop. in cities > 100,000 inhab. -0.09 -2.01 1.65 -0.08 -1.46 1.72* -0.07 -1.65 1.24 -0.04 -0.34 0.70
0.11 2.49 1.99 0.07 1.23 1.16 0.07 1.29 0.98 0.05 1.27 0.77
% pop. in cities > 500,000 inhab. 0.42§ -8.79 -0.18 0.19† -1.67 -0.29 0.20§ -0.27 -0.21 0.20§ -7.21* -0.19
0.19 7.71 0.43 0.10 3.84 0.37 0.10 3.41 0.33 0.09 4.50 0.21
GDP per capita 2.48 13.45 -3.47 0.75 4.99† -5.56 0.66 4.69† -4.47 1.75§ 7.80§ -0.98
0.97 5.08 7.38 0.60 2.73 3.73 0.55 2.60 4.12 0.43 2.59 2.68
Unemployment Rate 0.08 -2.03 -1.26 -0.19 -0.83* -0.97 -0.09 -0.50 -0.42 0.61† -0.99* 0.16
0.68 1.06 2.02 0.40 0.50 1.21 0.51 0.59 0.83 0.34 0.62 0.75
% natives w/ secondary educ. -0.02 -1.34 0.89 0.56* -0.36 1.44 0.58 -0.50 0.78 -0.54† -1.05* 0.63
0.57 1.23 1.87 0.38 0.67 1.13 0.37 0.82 0.88 0.29 0.68 0.87
% immigrants w/ secondary educ. 0.38 0.42 0.95 0.11 0.20 0.78† 0.17 0.24 0.94† 0.23§ 0.22 0.47§
0.22 0.29 0.80 0.13 0.15 0.44 0.19 0.25 0.52 0.11 0.17 0.22
% Spanish speaking immigrants w/
secondary educ.
0.00 0.05 0.22 -0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.10 -0.15 -0.19 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12
0.23 0.23 0.44 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.29 0.12 0.11 0.18
% Male natives aged 15-24 7.97 26.57 1.13 3.44§ 12.87§ -6.01 3.07§ 14.27§ -6.79 3.09§ 9.98§ -1.37
2.42 10.56 18.05 1.49 5.51 6.29 1.56 5.28 8.21 1.18 5.68 6.52
% Male natives aged 25-34 -0.93 11.88 -18.78 0.83 5.28 -11.65* 0.22 6.78* -7.97† -0.88 3.21 -8.57
3.22 9.52 18.61 2.04 5.28 9.06 1.62 5.04 5.78 1.24 5.21 8.78
% Male Immigrants aged 15-24 -0.42 -2.45 2.36 -0.13 -1.75 1.33 -0.02 -1.51* 0.33 -0.17 -0.93 1.06
0.81 1.92 2.81 0.52 1.18 1.59 0.50 1.05 1.91 0.44 0.97 1.35
% Male Immigrants aged 25-34 -0.02 3.49 1.38 0.05 1.83 0.33 0.12 2.13§ 0.64 0.09 1.63* 2.06†
0.42 1.94 1.48 0.26 0.99 0.81 0.30 1.02 0.65 0.23 1.04 1.06
Lagged dependent variable 0.86 0.45 1.00§ 0.84§ 0.40 0.88§ 0.84§ 0.37§ 0.90§ 0.91§ 0.56§ 0.95§
0.06 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.09
Hansen-Sargan test (% p-value) 3.4 22.8 25.6 15.1
AR(2) test (% p-value) 32.7 46.0 37.7 29.7
Note: *, †and § denote significance at the 20, 10 and 5 %, respectively. Year dummies included in all estimates. Standard errors are reported in italics below each estimated coefficient.
